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COERCION VS. COOPERATION:





ASSED by Congress in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), better known as
Superfund, imposes strict liability on potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) for the improper disposal of hazardous substances.' Congress en-
acted CERCLA to address the serious problem that hazardous waste sites
pose to human health and the environment. By imposing strict liability on
PRPs, Congress attempted to ensure that the parties responsible for creating
hazardous waste sites pay for their cleanup. 2 While viewed as a federal
cleanup law, CERCLA actually places responsibility on the PRPs. Because
CERCLA gives the Environmental Protection Agency an authoritarian
grant of power, however, it reduces the incentive for PRPs to voluntarily
participate in a hazardous waste site's cleanup and frustrates its very
purpose.
Section 107(a) of CERCLA 3 imposes joint and several,4 as well as strict,5
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (codified as amended at Supp. 1 (1989)).
2. David E. Jones & Kyle E. McSlarrow,... But Were Afraid to Ask: Superfund Case
Law, 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,430, 10,442 (Oct. 1989).
In response to widespread concern over the improper disposal of hazardous
wastes, Congress enacted CERCLA, a complex piece of legislation designed to
force polluters to pay for costs associated with remedying their pollution. A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, Senate Committee of Environment and Public Works
("A Legislative History"), S. Doc. No. 14, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1983)
(stating that one of the statute's principal goals is "assuring that those who
caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm ... ").
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
4. Even though its role in creating the hazardous waste site may be small, a PRP may be
held jointly and severally liable where the harm is indivisible. The PRP can then seek contri-
bution from other PRPs. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 570 n.2 (6th Cir.
1991).
5. The Second Circuit stated:
Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an
explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the compromise. Sec-
tion 9601(32) provides that "liability" under CERCLA "shall be construed to be
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liability on a broad spectrum of so-called PRPs.6 The section defines four
classes of PRPs: (1) the current owners and operators of the site or facility;7
(2) persons who owned and/or operated the facility at the time of the dispo-
sal or spill;8 (3) persons, typically the "generators" of the hazardous sub-
stance, who arranged for its disposal or treatment at the facility; 9 and (4)
persons who transported the hazardous substance and who arranged for its
disposal at the facility. 10 The trend of recent decisions shows that the courts
are expanding the possible classes of PRPs so that almost any party who
comes in contact with the site is liable. I
Section 107(a) also imposes liability for cleanup costs on PRPs.' 2 It au-
thorizes the government and others to seek reimbursement of cleanup costs
from PRPs.13 Liabilities include the cost of investigation, removal or reme-
dial action, and natural resource and assessment damages.' 4 The section
further provides that PRPs will be responsible for all other "necessary costs"
of response incurred by any person who comports with the goals of CER-
CLA.15 While the statute fails to expressly define "necessary cost," courts
have liberally construed its meaning. 1 6 Given the vagueness surrounding the
the standard of liability" under section 311 of the Clean Water Act ... which
courts have held to be strict liability.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. Cheryl Laurenz, Note, Landowner Liability and Toxic Waste: Application of CER-
CLA in United States v. Monsanto, 34 S.D. L. REV. 392 (1989).
7. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986) (discussing generally owner/operator liability), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
8. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding liable the previous owner who had owned the subject land at the time of the disposal),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
9. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1106 (1989). See generally Laurenz, supra note 6 (discussing the implications of Mon-
santo in detail).
10. See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,364 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 1987) (holding that defendant was not liable as a transporter
since he did not choose the facility where the hazardous substance was to be disposed).
11. Recent decisions indicate courts are expanding liability under CERCLA to extend to
parent and successor corporations, lenders, states, and suppliers. See Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that CERCLA permits cost recovery actions to be filed
against states and that Congress has the authority to authorizes such suits pursuant to the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Distler, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,942 (W.D.
Ky. Feb. 9, 1990) (holding successor corporation liable under the substantial continuity test
for the predecessor- corporation's CERCLA liability); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989) (holding parent corporation liable since it had the power to
control the subsidiaries' environmental policies at the time the hazardous wastes were gener-
ated); In re Peerless Plating Co., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,826 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
12, 1987) (holding that costs incurred by the EPA in a response action are recoverable against
the bankrupt estate); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986) (holding bank, which had acquired a site that constituted a "facility" under § 107(a)
through foreclosure, liable for response action costs); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp.
665 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding that a parent corporation of a wholly owned subsidiary is a
"owner or operator" under § 107(a), if the parent corporation owned the subsidiary at the time
of the disposal(s)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
15. Id.
16. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
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term "necessary cost" and the courts' willingness to liberally define it, PRPs
are potentially liable for almost any cost connected to site cleanups. The
courts' current trend toward expanding liability under section 107(a) makes
cost recovery actions a potent instrument for effectuating cleanups.1 7
As the reach of CERCLA liability expands, it is important to recognize
how the current application of the law affects the behavior of its target class
- PRPs. After an analysis of the provisions of CERCLA, PRPs who join
forces with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
undertaking a response action are at a greater disadvantage than those who
wait to be sued for reimbursement in a cost recovery action. Thus, the cur-
rent structure of the law dissuades PRPs from voluntarily becoming in-
volved at the inception of a cleanup action.
This Comment examines how the present construction of CERCLA dis-
courages PRPs from voluntarily undertaking responsibility for their part in
creating the hazardous waste sites. Section II provides a brief overview of
the provisions of CERCLA that are relevant in understanding why the cur-
rent structure discourages voluntary PRP participation. Section III exam-
ines the provisions of CERCLA and how they interact to frustrate its very
purpose. Finally, Section IV explores possible alternatives that could im-
prove the structure of the statute so that PRPs would be motivated to volun-
tarily undertake cleanup actions.
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA AND ITS PROVISIONS
A. SITE SELECTION
Once a site is identified as a potential danger, the EPA'8 can pursue one of
two alternatives. It can respond directly, as authorized by section 104 of
CERCLA,19 or it can compel PRPs to respond, as authorized by section 106
security and site investigation costs were recoverable); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that relocation costs are recov-
erable); Cadillac Fairview/Cal. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
security costs were recoverable); T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J.
1988) (holding that the billable time of corporate official involved in cleanup efforts could be
recoverable if facts were proved); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410
(W.D. Mich. 1988), afld sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990) (holding that the government could recover its indi-
rect costs and administrative expenses); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that the EPA & the Justice Depart-
ment could recover labor costs).
17. "The courts have breathed fiery life into the liability and cost recovery provisions of
§ 107 by giving them a 'broad and liberal construction.' " Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at
10,442.
18. Congress authorized the President to administer CERCLA. The President has, how-
ever, delegated the bulk of that authority, at least for non-federal sites, to the Environmental
Protection Agency's Administrator. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. 1 1989) (designating the EPA as the delegatee of the President's
authority).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. 1 1989). Where the President determines "imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment" exists because of an
"actual or threatened release" of a hazardous substance, "the President is authorized to act...
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of CERCLA. 20 The configurations of site cleanup are called response ac-
tions. CERCLA requires these actions, to the greatest extent possible, to be
in accordance with the provisions of the National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan. 2' The Plan, commonly referred to as
the National Contingency Plan (NCP), is a comprehensive regulatory
scheme developed by the EPA to serve as a blueprint for government
cleanups. 22
Subpart E of the NCP, entitled "Hazardous Substance Response," out-
lines the process of CERCLA actions.23 It establishes a method for ranking
waste sites and sets forth procedures for the subsequent response actions.
Specifically, it identifies methods for inventorying sites, suggests techniques
for cleanup, and coordinates intergovernmental cleanup activities. 24 As re-
quired by section 105(a) of CERCLA, all response actions must be consis-
tent with the NCP and, therefore, the requirements set out in Subpart E of
the NCP.
2 5
There are two types of response actions: immediate short-term removal
actions 26 and permanent remedial actions. 27 After the site is identified, the
EPA conducts a preliminary assessment to determine whether the site's con-
dition warrants a removal or remedial action. If an immediate action is not
necessary to abate an imminent danger, then the EPA conducts a prelimi-
to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action.., or take any other
response measure consistent with the [NCP] which the President deems necessary." Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. 1 1989). Where the President determines the existence of
"imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment" be-
cause of an "actual or threatened release" of a hazardous substance, the President can either
order (unilateral administrative order) a PRP(s) to undertake the response action or "require
the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief' from the PRP(s) in the appro-
priate federal district court. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
22. Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National Contingency Plan - More Detail and More
Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222, 10,226 (June
1990).
23. 40 C.F.R. § 300.400-.440 (1991).
24. Fredrick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of
Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 271.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
26. Removal action is defined as:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment,
such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release or
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as
may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threat of release.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. 1 1989).
27. Remedial action is defined as:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition
to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of hazardous
substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health of welfare or the environment.
Id. § 9601(24).
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nary investigation, called a Remedial Site Evaluation, 2 8 in order to deter-
mine whether the site is ripe for a remedial action. 29 The EPA uses the data
collected in this investigation to score the site under the Hazard Ranking
System (HRS).30 If the site scores over the threshold level (28.5), it is placed
on the National Priorities List (NPL).3 The EPA can undertake remedial
action only at sites that have been placed on the NPL.32
Once a site has been placed on the NPL, the EPA may choose to spend
Superfund 3 3 resources to remedy the problem; however, a site's placement
on the NPL does not necessarily imply that Superfund monies will be spent
to clean it up.34 After the EPA selects a site for remedial action, 35 it assigns
the site either to the Superfund program, where fund monies will be ex-
pended to undertake the cleanup action or to the enforcement personnel in
the site's region. 36 Enforcement personnel will attempt to compel the site
users or other identifiable PRPs "to act by means of an administrative order
and, if necessary, litigation conducted by the Department of Justice."'37 The
EPA primarily bases its choice of assignment upon the determination of
whether there are PRPs who will carry out the remedial action "properly
and promptly. '3 8
B. SITE INVESTIGATION
The next step in the CERCLA process, after the EPA places a site on the
NPL, is to conduct the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 300.410(h) (1991) (stating that if a removal assessment indicates that re-
medial action may be required, then EPA should initiate a remedial site evaluation).
29. Id. § 300.425.
30. Id. § 300 app. A.
31. Id. § 300 app. B.
32. Id. § 300.425(b)(1).
33. Superfund is a trust fund which is derived from general federal revenues and an excise
tax on specified chemicals. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. 1 1989). It acts as a reserve of capital that
is used to finance cleanup costs where a PRP cannot be identified or, in the government's
estimation, cannot "properly and promptly" carry out a designated cleanup action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 (Supp. 1 1989).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(2) (1991).
35. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a) (1984) (stating that all sites included on the NPL become
scheduled for remedial actions).
36. Anderson, supra note 24, at 288; see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text
(referring to CERCLA provisions that authorize each of these alternatives).
37. Anderson, supra note 24, at 288. How enforcement personnel go about securing com-
pliance from PRPs varies from region to region. See infra text accompanying notes 149, 154.
The EPA can issue a 'unilateral administrative order' (UAO) that orders the PRPs to imple-
ment the EPA's chosen remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. 1 1989). If the PRPs refuses to
comply with the order, the Department of Justice can seek compliance using the federal
courts. Furthermore, if the PRPs fail to comply with the order and fail to have sufficient cause
for it's non-compliance, penalties of $25,000 per day can be levied on the offender. Id.
§ 9606(b).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. 1 1989).
When the President determines that such action will be done properly and
promptly by the owner or operator of the facility or vessel or by any other re-
sponsible party, the President may allow such person to carry out the action,
conduct the remedial investigation, or conduct the feasibility study in accord-




This is perhaps the most important aspect of the cleanup process.39 The
remedial investigation (RI) characterizes the conditions at the site by deter-
mining the extent and movement of the contamination. 4° Using the infor-
mation collected in the RI, the feasibility study (FS) produces a set of
alternative cleanup approaches that could be implemented at the site.4 1 The
EPA screens the alternatives, chooses and evaluates the best, and then
selects a remedy.4 2 After the EPA designates the chosen cleanup action,
either the EPA or PRPs undertake the action. Under either option, the
party undertaking the response action can seek reimbursement or contribu-
tion from identifiable PRPs in a section 107(a) cost recovery action.43
C. SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT - COST RECOVERY ACTIONS
1. Elements of a Recovery Action
CERCLA section 107 authorizes "recovery actions" whereby the govern-
ment or any other person can seek reimbursement of costs expended during
removal or remedial actions." The elements necessary to establish a prima
facie case under section 107 are the following:
1) the site fits within the "facility" category; 45
2) there was a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at
39. "The RI/FS have become the centerpiece of the remedial program." Anderson, supra
note 24, at 290.
40. Id.; see also Starfield, supra note 22, at 10,228.
41. Starfield, supra note 22, at 10,228.
42. Id. EPA narrows the list of alternatives to the best ones (usually between three and
nine alternatives). Then they evaluate the remaining alternatives using the "Nine Criteria:" 1)
overall protection of human health and the environment; 2) compliance with other applicable
environmental regulations; 3) long term effectiveness; 4) reduction of toxicity, mobility, or
volume; 5) short term effectiveness; 6) implementability; 7) cost; 8) state acceptance; and 9)
community acceptance. Id. Section 117 of CERCLA requires the EPA to publish a proposed
remedial action plan (RAP) and to provide the community in which the site is located with the
opportunity to comment on the proposed action. Criteria eight and nine are evaluated based
on the response received by the EPA during this comment period. Once the EPA conducts its
evaluation of the proposed actions, it selects the best alternative and issues a record of decision
(ROD) which sets forth the chosen alternative. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. 1 1989).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1 1989). Section 113(f) of CERCLA authorizes PRPs to
seek contribution from other parties who are "liable or potentially liable under § 107(a)...
during or following any civil action taken under section 106... or under section 107(a)." 42
U.S.C. § 9613(0 (Supp. 1 1989). Thus, a PRP who has undertaken a response action or been
held liable for the cost of one, may seek contribution in a cost recovery action, as authorized by
section 107(a), pursuant to section 113(0.
44. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of cost recovery
actions under section 107(a)).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. 1 1989) defines "facility" as follows:
The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe of pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazard-
ous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use
or any vessel.
Id.; see Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th Cir. 1992)
(limiting the term "facility" to extend only to the area where the hazardous substances are
found/stored, not the entire site of the property).
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the facility;46
3) the release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur re-
sponse costs;4 7
4) the defendant falls within one of the four classes of "covered per-
sons" defined in § 9607(a);48
5) costs are consistent with the NCP. 49
Courts have broadly interpreted each of these elements.50 Moreover, the
defenses available in cost recovery actions are quite limited. 51 Thus, cost
46. 40 C.F.R. § 302 (1991) (listing substances classified as hazardous).
47. Jones and McSlarrow state:
[P]rivate parties must add to their pleadings an allegation that their costs of
response were "necessary." Compare CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1989) ... (stating that the government plaintiffs may recover
"all costs of removal or remedial action") with CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)... (stating that all other parties may recover only "nec-
essary costs of response").
Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,443. Courts have, however, defined "necessary cost"
broadly. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the broad range of costs that
courts have held recoverable as necessary costs of response actions).
48. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (discussing the four classes of "covered
persons").
49. Two different standards apply to the analysis of this element - consistency with the
NCP. The standards differ according to who the plaintiff in the cost recovery action is. Jones
& McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,443. The government enjoys a rebuttable presumption that
the costs incurred are not inconsistent with the NCP. Id. Defendants are liable for "all costs
of removal and remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an
Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the [NCP]." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(a) (Supp. 1 1989) (em-
phasis added). In contrast, private parties, such as PRP(s) seeking contribution from other
PRP(s), have an affirmative burden to prove that their costs are consistent with the NCP. Id.
Defendants are liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the [NCP]." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under the current
statute, the government has a substantially easier task in proving this element of its case. See
infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing how some courts have required "substantial
compliance" as opposed to "strict compliance"); see Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at
10,442.
50. See generally Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,442-46 (providing an analysis of
recent case law, which shows how courts are liberally interpreting these elements).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person other-
wise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting there-
from were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a con-
tractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and ac-
ceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics
of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omis-
sions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. 1 1989).
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recovery actions strongly favor the plaintiff. This is typical of strict liability
cases however.
2. Possibility of Punitive Damages
In addition to its expansive liability features, section 107 of CERCLA pro-
vides for the imposition of punitive damages.52 As recognized in Solid State
Circuits, Inc. v. EPA,53 Congress intended to allow the EPA, in its discre-
tion, to bring a claim for up to three times the amount of actual costs in-
curred by the Superfund against any PRPs who without sufficient cause
failed to comply with an EPA order. 54 The court noted that Congress in-
cluded this provision to ensure that PRPs would perform the clean-up activi-
ties without delay so that the EPA would not find it necessary to perform the
response action itself, thereby aiding the statute's primary goal of having
those who created the problem pay for it.55 The statute, however, does not
provide for the imposition of punitive damages when private parties or PRPs
seek to hold other PRPs liable.
3. Counterclaims
While counterclaims are normally permitted when the cause of action ac-
crues out of the same transaction or occurrence, 56 it is not always clear
whether the courts will allow such counterclaims to be brought against the
government. In government-initiated CERCLA cases, counterclaims are al-
lowed. 57 Once "the government institutes a cost recovery action, it thereby
waives sovereign immunity as to compulsory counterclaims seeking to di-
minish or defeat the government's recovery that arises out of the same trans-
action or occurrence that underlies the government's action." 58 Courts
usually allow counterclaims based on the doctrine of recoupment. 59 Coun-
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) provides:
If any person who is liable for a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial
action upon order of the President pursuant to section 9604 or 9606 of this title,
such person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages in an
amount at least equal to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs
incurred by the Fund as a result of such failure to take proper action. The
President is authorized to commence a civil action against any such person to
recover the punitive damages, which shall be in addition to any costs recovered
from such person pursuant to section 112(c) of this title [... ].
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. 1 1989).
53. 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
57. Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,441.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455, 458-59 (E.D. Va. 1988). The court held
that once the government had initiated a CERCLA suit, it had consented "to the assertion of
counterclaims under the doctrine of recoupment." Id. The doctrine of recoupment holds that
a counterclaim is allowable if it asserts "a claim arising out of the same transaction or occur-
rence which is the subject matter of the government's suit and seeks relief only to the extent of
diminishing or defeating the government's recovery." Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d
481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
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terclaims provide defending PRPs with a mechanism to challenge the gov-
ernment's expenditures in cost recovery actions. 0
III. WHY CERCLA ACTIONS DISCOURAGE VOLUNTARY
PARTICIPATION BY PRPS
A. THE POWER TRIP
1. Historical Backdrop
Shortly after Congress passed CERCLA,61 one critic responded quickly
that an important obstacle to expedient response action would be "the un-
willingness of private parties to sit idly by while the government incurs a
huge cleanup bill on their behalf."' 62 Shortly thereafter, however, the EPA
was criticized for the slow pace at which cleanups progressed, its failure to
provide adequate remedies for hazardous waste sites, and its alleged "sweet-
heart" deals with PRPs that reduced cleanup costs at the expense of effec-
tiveness.63 As a result of obvious flaws in CERCLA, 64 Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Re-authorization Act (SARA) in 1986.65
The amendments made to CERCLA under SARA sought to:
(i) better define cleanup standards;
(ii) enlarge the available resources for investigations and cleanups; and
(iii) clarify and emphasize the EPA's authority under CERCLA.66
As a result of the amendments, CERCLA now explicitly provides that no
PRP shall incur any benefit, direct or indirect, for its involvement with the
response action. 67 This historical insight helps explain the EPA's current
Inst.) 21,274 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1987) (allowing counterclaims based on recoupment but deny-
ing tortious injury claims).
60. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985) (allowing counterclaim
challenging extra costs incurred by government because of inadequate supervision on its be-
half). But cf United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that counter-
claims against the government must fail where they relate to actions taken by the EPA and its
contractors during the removal actions at the site of hazardous waste cleanup, since waivers of
sovereign immunity at §§ 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1) do not apply to government regulatory
actions pursuant to CERCLA's cleanup provisions, which are actions that are expressly ex-
empt under §§ 9607(d)(1) and (2)). The express exemptions under §§ 9607(d)(1) and (2) have
certain exceptions, however, that allow liability to attach where the federal government has
acted negligently and/or the state and local governments have acted with gross negligence. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1 1989).
61. Congress hastily passed CERCLA. The original Act contained a number of technical
errors and ambiguities due to Congress's limited understanding of hazardous wastes and the
problems they posed to the environment. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 34 (1982).
62. Randy M. Mott, Defenses Under Superfund, NAT. RESOURCES L. NEWSL., May
1981, at 1.
63. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991);
see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 279-80. Anderson accredits part of CERCLA's early
failures with the administration of the EPA during that time period. Id.
64. Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1417.
65. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (Supp. 1 1989)).
66. Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1147.
67. CERCLA § 104(a) now provides:
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negotiation posture with PRPs. The EPA has developed as its primary ob-
jective in negotiations, to maintain ultimate, if not complete, control over
any action undertaken. 68 Thus, given the SARA amendments and the
EPA's tight control over the entire process, any envisioned bargains for
PRPs who voluntarily become active in the response action appear to be
illusory.
2. Examples
A recent example of the EPA's need for control came in August 1990
when the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response (OSWER), Don R. Clay, issued a new policy directive. The
directive stated that the EPA's future policy regarding remedial investiga-
tions/feasibility studies (RI/FS) was that only the EPA could conduct
them.69 Since a RI/FS is the proverbial "tail that wags the dog" with re-
spect to constructing a cleanup plan, the EPA's attempt to control this step
indicates its intention to retain ultimate control over the entire response
action.
Beyond controlling the construction of a response action, the EPA also
seeks one hundred percent of cost recovery for any action it undertakes from
identified PRPs. 70 Since liability is joint and several, there is really no need
for the EPA to waste time and resources attempting to identify other PRPs
- unless the current PRP is financially unable to fund or perform the entire
cleanup. Therefore, one could ascertain that the EPA's main objective is to
find at least one PRP who can pay for the designated response action.71
In United States v. Cannons72 the EPA's conduct exhibited its authorita-
rian approach to negotiation with regard to cost recovery. The Cannons
case is indicative of the extent to which the EPA will go to ensure that it
receives one hundred percent reimbursement of its costs. In this case, the
In no event shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a lesser standard of
liability, receive preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether direct or
indirect, benefit from any such arrangements as a response action contractor, or
as a person hired or retained by such a response action contractor, with respect
to the release or facility in question.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. I 1989).
68. "EPA Policy calls for strict control of agenda of site cleanup, with [PRPs] assured of
only a brief opportunity to meet with agency personnel to discuss private implementation of
the remedy." Anderson, supra note 24, at 298.
69. Performance of Risk Assessments in Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Studies
(RI/FSs) Conducted by Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), OSWER Directive No.
9835.15, Aug. 1990. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing RI/FSs and
their relative importance to the entire cleanup process).
70. The goal in negotiations is 100% of cleanup cost. Hazardous Waste Enforcement
Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5036-37 (1985). But cf infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text
(discussing Global Consent Decrees' goal for recovery).
71. "One observer noted that CERCLA [the joint and several liability provision] simply
'make[s] it easier for government and victims to find somebody with money who can be
sued.'" Keith W. Holman, Note, Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc. and the 1986
Superfund Amendments: The Tide Turns on CERCLA's Private Right to Recover Hazardous
Waste Response Costs, 17 ENVTL. L. 307, 313 n.31 (1987) (citing Tom Alexander, The Hazard-
ous-Waste Nightmare, FORTUNE, Apr. 21, 1980, at 54.).
72. 720 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989), affid, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
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EPA initiated a suit against the non-settling defendants to recover the un-
paid balance of the response costs it incurred at four related sites. The EPA
also sought a declaratory injunction holding the non-settling defendants lia-
ble for any future costs as well. Some of the non-settling defendants in this
case were considered de minimis defendants. 73 Regardless of their percent-
age of responsibility, the EPA sought to hold the de minimis defendants
jointly and severally liable for the remaining balance along with the remain-
ing non-settling primary generators.
The EPA's initial de minimis administrative settlement offer required each
de minimis PRP to cover one hundred and sixty percent of their share of the
cleanup costs plus administrative costs.74 The EPA intended the sixty per-
cent "premium" to cover any unexpected costs that might arise from un-
known conditions that may be discovered in the future.75 The premium
would allow the settling PRPs a form of limited liability. 76 The EPA sent a
cover letter along with the offer to the de minimis PRPs that stressed their
interest in settling the case. 77
For those de minimis PRPs who rejected the initial settlement offer, the
EPA issued another administrative de minimis settlement offer that required
each PRP to pay two hundred and sixty percent of its share of the costs.
7 8
The EPA imposed an additional one hundred percent "surcharge" to en-
courage early settlement through setting precedent for future cases. 79 Those
who did not accept this second settlement offer found themselves named as
defendants in the eventual lawsuit, facing even greater liability. Thus, the
negotiation history between the EPA and the de minimis defendants clearly
exhibits EPA's unwillingness to negotiate and further demonstrates its pro-
pensity to dictate conditions and control the response process. The EPA's
negotiations policy could more appropriately be referred to as a policy of
coercion.
3. Significance
Under CERCLA, the EPA has two alternatives for site cleanup: Section
10480 allows the EPA to undertake the response action, clean up the site
itself, and then seek reimbursement from identifiable PRPs using section
107;8 1 or the EPA can compel either by administrative or judicial order the
identifiable PRPs to undertake response action as allowed under section
73. De minimis is a term used to define a PRP who is volumetrically responsible for less
than one percent of the total problem at a hazardous waste site. Id. at 1033. Since CERCLA
provides for joint and several liability, courts can theoretically hold de minimis PRPs liable for
one hundred percent of the total response cost.
74. Id. at 1033.
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1989). This section allows PRPs who settle with the
government to receive certain protections from future liability.
77. Cannons, 720 F. Supp. at 1033. The court classified this cover letter as a warning to
PRPs that the EPA expected them to agree to the settlement.
78. Id. at 1034.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 19 (listing important provision of § 104).
81. See infra note 189 (discussing the provisions of § 104(b) and § 107(a)(4)(A)).
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106.82 Few incentives exist for PRPs to voluntarily come forward and agree
to work with the EPA. As indicated by the EPA's desire to control the
RI/FS, there is little hope that PRPs who voluntarily involve themselves in
a response action will be able to have a hand in shaping the selected re-
sponse. 83 Furthermore, the statute itself states that PRPs should not derive
any benefit from their participation in a response action. 84
Although Congress enacted CERCLA to encourage responsible parties to
take responsibility for their part in the problem, 85 in reality, the statute,
under its current implementation, discourages such voluntary participation
and cooperation. In an attempt to strengthen the CERCLA statute, Con-
gress enacted SARA, one of the goals of which was to empower the EPA.
After reviewing the EPA's use of the newly granted power, one should ques-
tion whether the EPA has become too powerful. Instead of promoting par-
ticipation through cooperation, the EPA employs a policy of dictation and
coercion in the response process, which is hardly conducive to encouraging
voluntary participation.
B. PARTICIPATION IN RESPONSE ACTIONS
1. Neither the Courts Nor Congress Require the EPA to Solicit
Participation from PRPs
PRPs are not given much voice in the response action other than to under-
take the action and pay for it. Courts have held that the EPA's failure to
consult the PRPs or allow them to participate in a response action is not a
defense in a cost recovery action. 86 Courts have consistently rejected the
argument that the EPA must give PRPs the opportunity to clean up a site at
their own expense before the EPA takes any response action.
In United States v. Mottolo87 the court, citing United States v. Medley,88
held that CERCLA does not compel but, rather, encourages PRPs' partici-
pation in a cleanup. 89 After careful analysis of CERCLA's language in sec-
tion 104, the court, in United States v. Dickerson,90 concluded that the EPA
did not have to give the PRPs an opportunity to begin the response measures
before undertaking a cleanup action itself since public policy concerning the
public welfare requires the courts to give broad and liberal interpretation to
82. See supra note 20 (listing the pertinent provisions of § 106).
83. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the negative impressions of
pre-SARA enforcement of CERCLA, where it was alleged that the EPA gave PRPs "sweet-
heart" deals that compromised efficiency for the sake of lowering response costs, and the rele-
vant SARA amendments); see also infra notes 105-07, 204 (discussing the limited opportunity
for PRPs to challenge the EPA without exposing itself to potential liability for punitive
damages).
84. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
85. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
86. See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (both holding that government had no affirmative
duty to consult with PRPs prior to undertaking a CERCLA response action).
87. 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
88. ERC 1858 (D.S.C. 1986).
89. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 628.
90. 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986).
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the provisions of the statute.9 1 If the court had held that the defendant
PRPs should be given an opportunity to respond first, it would have created
a potential "out" for defendants in future lawsuits in which the government
acted hastefully. Thus, public policy considerations required the court to
overrule this contention. 92
Furthermore, section 117 of CERCLA93 provides that the EPA is not
required to solicit or permit the participation of PRPs, other than under the
general notice and comment provisions.94 In addition, when Congress
passed SARA, section 122 of CERCLA was amended to provide that the
government could undertake cleanup by itself and then seek reimbursement
from the PRPs.95 The purpose of this amendment was to prevent PRPs
from interfering with, and thus, hindering the cleanup process. 96 Since the
EPA's policy is to maintain tight control over the design and cleanup pro-
cess,97 any PRP participation would be to little or no avail in cost control.
Thus, if the EPA wants to undertake a response action without interference
by PRPs, PRPs should be content to allow the EPA to do so.
2. Challenging the EPA's Decisions
In an effort to give CERCLA the "broad and liberal" interpretation in-
tended by Congress, the courts are granting the EPA broad and sweeping
powers.98 The combination of judicial and congressional (statutory) empow-
erment has acted to give the EPA an authoritarian grant of power. Two
91. Id. at 452-53.
92. See also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1985) (con-
cluding that the EPA's failure to provide PRPs with notice or opportunity to conduct their
own cleanup before the EPA conducted its response action pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA
does not prevent the EPA from seeking recovery of response costs under § 107(a) of CERCLA
since CERCLA's purpose is to have the EPA act quickly to remedy environmental problems
posed by hazardous waste sites).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. 1 1989).
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. 1 1989).
96. "In enacting the 1986 amendments of CERCLA [commonly referred to as SARA],
Congress sought to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(a) (Supp. V 1987)." United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1491 (W.D. Okla.
1990).
97. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's general authorita-
rian policy).
98. "In CERCLA Congress enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance the
authority of the EPA to respond effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that
threatened the environment and human health." B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1197 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.
Ind. 1987). In Seymour, the court stated that
[t]he justification for empowering the executive agency to select remedies under
both Section 104 and Section 106 is found in the subsequent provisions of Sec-
tion 121, which require that cleanups meet stringent technical standards and
that alternative remedies be assessed for economic and policy considerations.
Such determinations are commonly and properly entrusted to agencies with the
expertise to make such judgments.
Id. at 862. The reason Congress empowered the EPA through the provisions of CERCLA was
because of its own lack of technical knowledge in that area. Even though both sides go to the
courthouse with a battery of experts, the courts continue to empower the EPA under the
pretext of deferring to Congressional intent. Can a bureaucracy, like the EPA always be right?
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recent decisions, United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.99 and Apache Pow-
der Co. v. United States'00 exhibit the courts' willingness to defer to the
EPA's decisions in the absence of contrary authority.' 0 '
In Alcan Aluminum Corp. the court concluded that the EPA's interpreta-
tion of CERCLA, which it is in charge of enforcing, "is entitled to consider-
able deference and must be adhered to where it is reasonable and consistent
with the language of the statute."'' 0 2 The court in Apache Powder Co. went
even further and held that it must defer to the EPA's factual findings with
regard to their preliminary assessment in the "absence of specific reasons" to
the contrary. 0 3 By deferring to the EPA whenever an opposing argument
Should the courts automatically defer to the EPA's decisions, or is to do so an injustice in
itself?
Understandably, there is a need for expediency with respect to cleanup projects at hazardous
waste sites. "In order to avoid the conflict between the PRPs' interest in inexpensive cleanup
and the public's interest in safe and rapid remedies, CERCLA empowers EPA to clean up
waste sites itself, and to collect from PRPs after the cleanup has been completed." Cabot
Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1988). However, one needs to question
whether resources are being sacrificed unnecessarily for the sake of expediency. See infra notes
120-29 and accompanying text (discussing a case where the court does not follow the standard
procedure, goes beyond the administrative record in reviewing the chosen response action,
realizes that the PRPs have developed a stronger and less expensive proposal, and rejects the
EPA's proposal).
99. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
100. 968 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
101. In general, whenever a dispute arises concerning the meaning of a statutory term or
provision, and the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court
must defer to the administrating agency's interpretation. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714,
722 (1989). This is known as the Chevron Rule. Id. Since the President delegated his powers
under CERCLA to the EPA (see supra note 18), the EPA is considered the administering
agency for purposes of the Chevron Rule. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 909
n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (deferring to the EPA because it "has been entrusted [by the President]
with the administration of CERCLA").
102. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 262-63.
103. Apache Powder Co., 968 F.2d at 71. Compare id. with National Gypsum Co. v. EPA,
968 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and Kent County, Del. Levy Court v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) and Anne Arundel County, Md. v. EPA, 963 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In these
cases the courts found sufficient grounds to rule for the defendant PRPs instead of deferring to
the EPA's assessment. In National Gypsum, the court held that the EPA's decision was arbi-
trary and capricious because the EPA had failed to provide any scientific evidence to ade-
quately support the basis for its decision. National Gypsum Co., 968 F.2d at 43-44 (stating
that "[t]he EPA's inferences, however, are nothing more than unsupported assumptions, and
our previous decisions recognizing the necessarily cursory nature of the NPL listing process,
do not entitle the EPA to base a listing decision on unsupported assumptions") (citations omit-
ted). In Kent County and Anne Arundel, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the EPA's
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Kent County, 963 F.2d at 399; Anne Arundel, 963 F.2d
at 417. The court decided these cases the same day. In both cases, the court overruled the
EPA's decision to list the site on the NPL. Kent County, 963 F.2d at 399; Anne Arundel, 963
F.2d at 417. In Kent County documents were discovered that showed the EPA had failed to
follow its required procedure for testing. While the EPA argued that these documents were
outside the administrative record and therefore could not be considered by the court, the court
broke with the standard of review and considered the documents which outlined the proper
method for testing. On the basis of these documents, the court concluded that the EPA's
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. The court then based its decision in Anne Arundel
on its Kent County holding because both cases involved the same testing procedure and failure
to follow the required procedure. Id. at 416. Notice that in cases involving a municipality or
other local government entity, the courts have shown a greater willingness to go beyond the
scope of the administrative record when making its decisions. See infra notes 127-28 and
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lacks express authority to the contrary, the courts have significantly added
to the EPA's empowerment under CERCLA.
Once PRPs commit to undertake a response action, various problems may
arise. For instance, when the EPA designates the chosen response action,
there is little opportunity for PRPs to challenge the EPA's Record of Deci-
sion (ROD).10 4 Under section 107 of CERCLA, 10 5 the EPA may fine PRPs
up to $25,000 per day for non-compliance with an administrative order.
Furthermore, if the EPA decides not to pursue an action in the courts, but
instead undertakes the response action itself, then the EPA has the discre-
tion to seek treble damages, as well as actual response costs, when it subse-
quently files suit for reimbursement pursuant to section 107.106 Thus, the
PRPs become liable for up to four times the actual response costs.' 0 7
In Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States108 the Eighth Circuit held that
the district court "lacked subject matter jurisdiction to engage in pre-en-
forcement review of the merits of an order issued by the EPA pursuant to
accompanying text (discussing that the Hardage court went outside the administrative record
in making a determination and that one of the considerations in doing so was the State of
Oklahoma's opposition to the EPA's proposal).
104. The legislative history of SARA indicates that "several legislators emphasized that the
timing-of-review provisions should be read broadly to preclude review of any action under
CERCLA until the time at which review is specifically permitted under the appropriate sub-
section of § 9613(h)." Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Section
113(h) provides that federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction for pre-enforcement
reviews of any removal action taken by the EPA pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under
section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code (relating to diversity of citi-
zenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and ap-
propriate under section 121 of this Title (relating to cleanup standards) to
review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 104,
or to review any order issued under section 106(a), in any action except one of
the following:
(1) An action under section 107 to recover response costs or damages or for
contribution.
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 106(a) or to recover a
penalty for violation of such order.
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 106(b)(2).
(4) An action under section 310 (relating to citizens suits) alleging that the re-
moval or remedial action taken under section 104 or secured under section 106
was in violation of any requirement of this Act. Such an action may not be
brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at
the site.
(5) An action under section 106 in which the United States has moved to com-
pel a remedial action.
Superfund Amendments and Re-Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (Supp. 1 1989)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1989). A person who fails without sufficient cause to properly
provide removal or remedial action as ordered by the EPA is subject to treble damages. Id.;
see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. 1 1989).
107. United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526, 529 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that under
§ 107(c)(3) of CERCLA the government could recover up to a total of four times response
costs expended in cleaning up hazardous waste site).
108. 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987); see supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing




section 106 of CERCLA."'109 The court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
controversy that challenges the merits of an administrative order until the
EPA has commenced an action seeking either compliance or recompense. "0
While punitive damages will not be assessed if the PRPs can show "sufficient
cause," it is a rather large gamble for PRPs to take, especially in light of the
fact that courts are willing to defer to the EPA's interpretations of CERCLA
and its decisions in the absence of contrary authority."' Thus, if a PRP
disagrees with the response action chosen by the EPA in its ROD, the PRP
cannot challenge the order without subjecting itself to liability for treble
damages as well as the imposition of daily fines.
Nonetheless, the Solid State Circuits court upheld the constitutionality of
this statutory scheme.' 1 2 The court felt that the statutory allowance for
"sufficient cause" 13 provided the PRPs with adequate protection. The EPA
argued that "[a]s a Federal agency, [it] must be presumed to act cor-
rectly.," 14 Thus, it contended that an "arbitrary and capricious standard"
was the appropriate standard of review for its administrative order. The
court interpreted this argument as advocating the use of an objective stan-
dard when determining whether "sufficient cause" existed for the chal-
lenge. '15 The court accepted the EPA's argument and adopted an "objective
standard" of review. 1 16
109. Solid State Circuits, 812 F.2d at 386.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
112. Plaintiffs challenged the statutory scheme, whereby the district courts are without
jurisdiction to examine the merits of an EPA order in a pre-enforcement hearing, as a violation
of their due process rights. They argued that "they found themselves stuck between a rock and
a hard place." Solid State Circuits, 812 F.2d at 388. The court concluded that the apparent
"Hobson's choice" was illusory since "sufficient cause" should be interpreted to mean "good
faith," thereby affording PRPs with "adequate protection against imposition of the treble dam-
age penalty." Id.; see also Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 748 (D. Kan.
1985) (holding CERCLA's provision of "good faith" defense sufficiently answers any due pro-
cess objections based on an assertion that the Act's penalty provision chills access to judicial
review). But cf Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In Aminoil, the
court conducted a three factor balancing test. The court set forth three factors for considera-
tion when attempting to determine the probability of success on a due process challenge: (1)
the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the present proce-
dures, and (3) the government and public interest at stake. Id. at 74 (citing Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The Aminoil court stated "[a]lthough the government's
interest in handling emergency waste situations in an efficacious manner is significant, this
Court is not convinced that this interest could not be addressed through a scheme that never-
theless provides the most rudimentary elements necessary to satisfy due process." Id. While
the Aminoil court concluded that the plaintiffs had a viable due process challenge based on
their evaluation of the three factor test, courts are currently in disagreement with that proposi-
tion. Id. at 76. Given Congress's primary goal for CERCLA, courts have given the govern-
ment's interest in expedient cleanup procedures more weight than any of the other interests in
the Mathews three factor test. Therefore, courts currently uphold the constitutionality of the
statute's penalty provision.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. 1 1989).
114. Solid State Circuits, 812 F.2d at 390.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 391. Since the court failed to use the terminology "arbitrary and capricious" in
its final holding, its decision is ambiguous regarding how much of the EPA's argument it
adopted when it promulgated the "objective standard."
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In United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp.,117 however, the court recog-
nized that "section 113(j) of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, requires the
conclusion that judicial review of the EPA's remedy decision in CERCLA
cases must be based on the administrative record, applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard."' 18 When a court limits its review to the administrative
record, the ROD, the opportunity for a meaningful challenge is reduced.
Moreover, the arbitrary and capricious standard, which gives the EPA sig-
nificant latitude in its decision-making capacity, reduces further the possibil-
ity of a substantive challenge. Therefore, given the timing and standard of
review, any challenges brought by the PRPs to the EPA's response action
must necessarily be raised as counterclaims against excessive cost recovery
under section 107 of CERCLA.119
United States v. Hardage120 exemplifies a rarity among CERCLA cases.
In Hardage the trial court sought to select a remedy for the cleanup of a
closed industrial waste disposal site. This case represents the rare occasion
where a successful challenge was mounted against an EPA-designated re-
sponse action prior to its implementation. The United States advanced the
argument that judicial review of the EPA's selected remedy should be lim-
ited to a review of the administrative record using the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard.' 2' The court refused to follow this customary course of
review, however, and instead, conducted a de novo review.122
117. 679 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
118. Id. at 861. Sections 113(j)(1) and (2) provide:
(1) Limitation - In any judicial action under this Act, judicial review of any
issues concerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the
President shall be limited to the administrative record. Otherwise applicable
principles of administrative law shall govern whether any supplemental materi-
als may be considered by the court.
(2) Standard - In considering objections raised in any judicial action under
this Act, the court shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the response
action unless the objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative record,
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
the law.
42 U.S.C. § 113(j)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1 1989), as added by SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113(c)(2),
100 Stat. 1613, 1650 (1986) (emphasis added).
119. Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
120. 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
121. Id. at 1470.
122. Id. at 1471. The United States' original complaint alleged violations of § 7004 of the
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. § 6973), as well as violations
of § 106(a) and § 107 of CERCLA. Id. at 1469. In its earlier motion to restrict review to the
administrative record, the court denied the motion because "SARA record review provisions
were not applicable to the United States' claim for injunctive relief under section 7003 of
RCRA." Id. at 1470. Subsequently, the United States certified the administrative record,
which supported the EPA's ROD, moved again to restrict judicial review to the EPA's admin-
istrative record, and also moved to dismiss its claims based on § 7003 of RCRA. Id. The
court granted the dismissal of the RCRA claims; however, it denied the motion for an admin-
istrative record review. Id. at 1471. In an accompanying memorandum decision, the court
stated that a "reversal of the Court's earlier rulings concerning the scope of review was not
warranted by the United States' withdrawal of the claim based on section 7003 of RCRA or by
the United States' filing of the administrative record." Id. Thus, de novo review of the United
States' proposed remedy occurred solely as a result of legal gymnastics of a kind never seen
before or since. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the subsequent cases
that lambasted this decision as contrary to the statutory scheme).
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The EPA proposed an "excavation" and "soil vapor extraction" rem-
edy. 123 Excavation is a process through which a substantial portion, but not
all, of the hazardous wastes is removed from the site. Soil vapor extraction
removes highly toxic and mobile compounds from the surface. The EPA
estimated this type of response action would cost approximately $70 million.
The defendants, 124 however, countered that such a remedy would more
likely cost $150 million due to inevitable "major repair contingencies, opera-
tion, and maintenance."'125
The defendants proposed a "containment" remedy, which is designed to
pump large quantities of the hazardous wastes from the site, while contain-
ing the remaining hazardous wastes. The defendants and the EPA agreed
that this remedy would cost approximately $54 million. 126 The EPA stated,
however, that the containment portion of the defendants' remedy was guar-
anteed to fail and that the only remaining question was when.
The court evaluated all of the evidence de novo. It then rejected the
EPA's proposed remedy and ordered the defendants' "containment" rem-
edy, after minor court-instituted modifications, to be implemented. 127 The
court cited many reasons for its decision to reject the EPA's proposal. 128
After a complete evaluation of all the evidence offered, however, the court
concluded "[t]he legitimate safety concerns with respect to excavation at the
Hardage Site, coupled with the marginal utility of excavation given the evi-
dence regarding the number of ruptured drums, persuades the Court that
excavation is not appropriate."'' 29 Thus, the court was not convinced that
the EPA's plan would be safe or effective.
Even though the result reached by the Hardage court is beneficial because
it selected the better remedy, several courts have criticized the legal gymnas-
123. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. at 1462.
124. The EPA named 32 generators and 3 transporters as defendants to its suit for injunc-
tive relief under "section 106(a) of CERCLA to require the defendants to clean up the site, and
to recover costs incurred by the United States under section 107 of CERCLA." Id at 1469.
Several of these defendants bonded themselves together to form the Hardage Steering Commit-
tee (HSC). This group was the driving force behind the defendants' successful bid against the
EPA. As a group, the PRPs formed a much stronger legal force than anyone could have
established alone. Even the court noted that the trial moved rapidly due in part to the "ex-
tremely high caliber of legal representation on both sides of the lawsuit." Id. at 1463.
125. Id. at 1462.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1523.
128. One main reason why the court rejected the EPA's proposal was its "vacillating na-
ture." Id. at 1475. "The government's proposed remedy changed so many times during the
course of this litigation, and in such drastic measures, that the Court lost confidence in the
deliberative process underlying the government's final proposal." Id. The court further cited
the following reasons as other considerations weighing in favor of the defendants' proposal:
The "(S]tate of Oklahoma's opposition to the government's excavation proposal, the lack of
due consideration given to the views of state authorities, the ambiguity of the excavation pro-
posals presented in the government's case, and the unreliability of the government's estimates
concerning the number of intact drums in the main pit and barrel mound areas." Id. at 1474.
Notice that the court listed the State's concerns before it listed the actual considerations it
subsequently lists as the determinative reasons.
129. Id. at 1477.
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tics used to reach it. In United States v. Bell Petroleum Services, Inc. 130 the
court described the Hardage court's approach as "hypertechnical and incon-
sistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language." 13 1 The Hardage
court may have manipulated the law. It did so, however, to produce a better
solution to the problem. 132
Public policy should promote the most effective and efficient response ac-
tion possible. As the decision in Hardage indicates, the EPA does not al-
ways develop the best alternative. Yet, without the legal gymnastics
accomplished by the Hardage court, the court's decision to choose the
PRPs' remedy because it was more effective and more efficient, could never
have been reached.' 33
Courts consistently justify limiting the review of the merits to the adminis-
trative record based on the construction and the intent of CERCLA.134 In
United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc. 135 the court stated in direct
criticism of the Hardage decision that:
[w]e believe section 9613(j) reflects Congress'[s] intent that in this
highly technical area, decisions concerning the selection of remedies
should be left to EPA, and those decisions should be accepted or re-
jected - not modified - by the district court under an arbitrary and
capricious standard.... A reviewing court should not attempt to sub-
stitute its judgment for the expertise of EPA officials. Ours is the task
of searching for errors of procedure, and serious omissions of substan-
tive evidence, not the job of reformulating a scientific clean-up program
130. 718 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
131. Id. at 591; see also United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1409
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "we believe that court [Hardage] misinterpreted the plain lan-
guage of CERCLA and the congressional intent behind the statute"); In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that "[i]f the Hardage
court's interpretation of the statute is correct [regarding de novo review], Congress has enacted
an unusual statutory scheme .... ").
132. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing the role of "how I want it to come out" in judicial
decision-making).
133. De novo review allowed the PRPs to present evidence that its proposal was better.
Under a review of the merits limited to the administrative record, the PRPs would have been
limited to proving that the EPA's decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Thus, a de novo
review allowed the court to conduct a balancing test with the two proposed remedies and
choose the best. In contrast, under administrative record review, the PRPs would have had
the additional burden of disproving the EPA's proposal by showing that it was made arbitrar-
ily and capriciously.
In United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990), the court stated
"[w]hile the district court should not mechanistically rubberstamp the agency's suggestions,
neither should it approach the merits of the contemplated settlement de novo." Id. at 84.
However, unless a court conducts a de novo review, it is tremendously difficult not to just
rubberstamp the agency's decision especially since the Chevron rule requires the courts to
defer to the EPA's judgment absent authority to the contrary. This proposition is further
evidenced by the fact that Hardage, which was reviewed de novo, is a rarity among CERCLA
cases where the PRPs' proposal actually triumphed over the EPA's.
134. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1424 (6th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the Hardage decision contradicts the wording and intent of the statute); see also
supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discussing the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard).
135. 949 F.2d at 1409.
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developed over the course of months or years.136
Thus, the major criticisms of allowing de novo review are the courts' lack of
expertise and interest in expediency.
Lack of expertise should not be an issue, however, since both sides will
present certified experts in the field. The fact finder should then base its
decision on the credibility and findings of the witnesses presented. Further-
more, the challenge of remedy selection should be allowed at the conclusion
of investigations when both sides have already conducted their findings of
fact. The criticism that to allow such challenges would "handcuff the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) by delaying effective responses to emer-
gency situations,"' 137 can be countered by the fact that the Hardage court
concluded its "remedy selection phase" of the trial in just eleven days. 138
While Hardage represents an anomaly in CERCLA cases, some important
points can be gleaned from it. The remedy selected by the EPA is not al-
ways the best alternative. Therefore, the public should be leery that the
courts give the EPA's decisions an automatic presumption of validity.
When a PRP has voluntarily come forward to participate in the response
action, there can be no doubt that a major motivating factor is the desire of
the PRP to control response costs. Under the current implementation of
CERCLA, this is most likely a fallacy. 139 As seen in Hardage, however, it
may be possible to provide cost efficiency for the PRPs and still be able to
provide a safe and effective remedy for the public.
Unfortunately, the Hardage approach has not been accepted, and courts
continue to give a great deal of deference to the EPA's decisions. 140 As the
courts continue to empower the EPA, the methods for employing CERCLA
become less negotiable and more authoritarian in nature. Given the EPA's
current dictatorial negotiation policy, 141 it is counterproductive for PRPs to
voluntarily subject themselves to the conflicts that inevitably arise during the
course of a response action with the EPA. 142 The EPA's stance on negotia-
tion, coupled with the courts' willingness to defer to the EPA's judgment in
most controversies, should diminish any inclination on behalf of PRPs to
participate in a cleanup effort unless compelled to do so.
136. Id. at 1425.
137. Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
138. United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
139. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the unlikely possibility that
PRPs will realize savings through cost control under the current implementation of
CERCLA).
140. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. (Does the interest of a local govern-
ment play an important role in determining how much deference a court will give the EPA?).
141. See supra part II.A. and note 71 and accompanying text. See generally Anderson,
supra note 24.
142. The EPA requires tight control over the entire cleanup process. A safe assumption is
that the EPA is looking for a party, a PRP, who will foot the bill for its cleanup plan. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the view that the EPA is just looking for
someone to sue).
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3. Pre-Litigation Interest
Unless PRPs have an opportunity to contribute in a meaningful way to
the design and implementation of a response action, the PRPs may find it
more beneficial to let the EPA clean the site up itself and seek reimburse-
ment for the costs later, thereby saving the PRPs the time, energy, and cost
of undertaking a response action in conjunction with or under the guidance
of the EPA.143 According to section 107(a) of CERCLA, pre-judgment in-
terest is not obtainable unless the EPA has demanded payment prior to its
own expenditure of funds. 44 Since PRPs have relatively little control over
the expenditures of a response action, the time value of money is an impor-
tant factor to consider when deciding whether or not to become voluntarily
involved in a response action.
The average total cost of a remedial site cleanup is $27.8 million.145 The
average time commitment for a remedial site cleanup is between eight and
one half years and ten years from the sites listed on the NPL. 146 Since the
riskless rate is currently 3.4% on short-term investments, 147 a PRP would
only have to invest $1.2 million at the riskless rate to get the $1.3 million to
repay the government for the RI/FS once it was completed. 48
The amount of time that passes before the EPA seeks to establish liability,
compliance, or recovery of costs from PRPs varies from region to region and
from case to case. Any time that passes before the EPA seeks any of those
above requests, however, is "free time" for non-complying PRPs. If PRPs
voluntarily undertook a response action, they would not benefit from this
free time. Furthermore, uncertainty as to whether and when a PRP would
143. Courts have interpreted CERCLA as allowing the EPA to do the cleanup itself with-
out the hassle of the PRPs' participation. See generally supra notes 87-94 and accompanying
text. Thus, PRPs should happily defer given that the EPA is almost omnipotent with regard to
decisionmaking under CERCLA. But most important is the time value of money saved while
sitting back and waiting for the EPA to come knocking.
144. "The amounts recoverable in an action under this section [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] shall
include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such in-
terest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in
writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1 1989)
(emphasis added).
145. The average total cost of RI/FS per site is $1.3 million. The average total cost of the
remedial action design is $1.5 million. The average total cost of the actual remedial action is
$25 million. Thus, the average total cost of a remedial site cleanup is $27.8 million. 40 C.F.R.
pt. 300 (1992).
146. The average time commitment for a RI/FS per site runs between 18 and 30 months.
The average time commitment for a remedial action design runs from between a year to a year
and a half. The average time commitment for the actual remedial action is estimated at six
years. Thus, the average time commitment for a remedial site cleanup is between eight and a
half and ten years. "Superfund Progress as of June 1992 - Aficionado's version," OSWER
Directive No. EPA 9200.1-12B, Aug. 1992.
147. United States Treasury Securities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1993, at C10.
148. Since it is the EPA's policy to perform the RI/FS itself, if the EPA does not seek
compliance and/or reimbursement until this process is completed, then the PRP will have
already saved approximately $64,000 that it could get by investing the costs pending comple-
tion of the process. (Present Value = total cost of RI/FS divided by the riskless rate raised to
the time period before realization, in our case before the EPA seeks recompense.) Also, one




be named by the EPA, or other PRPs, the possibility of punitive damages,
and the relatively small chance that participation would lead to cost efficient
measures or savings are all factors that need to be considered before PRPs
voluntarily undertake a response action in conjunction with or under the
guidance of the EPA since each has a direct bearing on the overall cost of
response, which is probably the primary concern of PRPs.
C. COST RECOVERY
1. Government-Instituted Actions
When the government seeks cost recovery pursuant to section 107 of
CERCLA, the EPA shoots for "global consent decrees.' 1 49 These decrees
are settlement agreements reached prior to trial that address all known
PRPs. David Moore, an attorney for the EPA, cited two major reasons why
a global consent decree usually cannot be reached: (1) Either the EPA does
not have complete information regarding all potentially responsible par-
ties;15° or (2) In its attempt to reach a global consent decree, the PRPs form
a steering committee, negotiations breakdown, and no settlement can be
reached. 15' Under global consent decrees, the EPA seeks to recover eighty-
five percent of its response costs.' 52 Basically, the EPA supplements fifteen
percent of the costs to compensate for those PRPs who are either out of
business or have remained unidentified. Since the average cost of a response
action runs $27.8 million,' 53 one can estimate the average supplement at
approximately $4.25 million. Thus, the savings realized by the settling PRPs
are quite substantial.
2. PRP-Instituted Actions
PRPs who undertake a response action under section 106 of CERCLA,
however, are expected to arrange and pay for the EPA-designated action.
While section 113(f) provides that a PRP may seek contribution from other
PRPs, the response a PRP must undertake in identifying all other PRPs
from which it can seek contribution' 54 and then attempt to recover its costs
of response from them. Under PRP-initiated section 106 actions, the gov-
ernment's supplement given to settling defendants in a government-insti-
149. Telephone Interview with David Moore, an attorney, the EPA - Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 9, 1993); see supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (exemplifying treatment of non-
settling defendants).
150. Moore noted, however, that when the EPA does not have complete information, the
other identified PRPs are usually more than willing to come forward with any information
they have regarding other potential PRPs. Moore, supra note 149. This probably reflects the
power of the joint and several liability provision in CERCLA more than a showing of coopera-
tion by the PRPs.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
154. Any information that the EPA has on other identified PRPs is discoverable through
the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1 1989). According to Moore,
whether the EPA continues to search for identifiable PRPs once it has a PRP voluntarily
participating in the response action varies from region to region. See Moore, supra note 149.
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tuted action is not available to the PRPs who have voluntarily consented to
participate in the cleanup process. 155 Also, the government can collect its
indirect costs associated with and incurred as a result of undertaking the
response action. 156 Furthermore, a majority of the courts have refused to
allow PRPs to recover attorney's fees for their cost recovery actions. 157
Thus, the PRPs who voluntarily undertake a response action will invariably
incur greater response costs.
a. Standards of Recovery
After the PRPs identify other PRPs from which they can seek contribu-
tion, they will most likely have to file suit to recover their costs since they
lack the power that the EPA possesses to compel settlements. When seeking
cost recovery under section 107, PRPs must establish the prima facie ele-
ments of the cause of action as established by that section of CERCLA. The
elements are as follows: 1) The site fits within the "facility" category; 2)
There was a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the
facility; 3) The release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur re-
sponse costs; 4) The defendant falls within one of the four classes of "cov-
ered persons" defined in section 9607(a); and 5) Costs are consistent with the
NCP. 158 Given that courts award the EPA considerable deference and that
the EPA ordinarily ordered the response,' 59 the first four elements are fairly
easy to establish. With regard to the fifth and final element, however, the
courts have construed the statute to apply different burdens of proof for dif-
ferent plaintiffs.
The statutory language of CERCLA "indicates that Congress intended
that a different standard apply to parties other than the federal government
seeking response costs. Furthermore, these parties must affirmatively prove
that their actions are necessary and consistent with the NCP."'16 Section
107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA provides that "all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State ... not inconsis-
tent with the national contingency plan" are recoverable.16 In contrast, sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) states that "any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan" are re-
155. See Moore, supra note 149. The EPA prefers to settle the suit with global consent
decrees. Id.
156. See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (discussing the recovery of indirect and
non-attributable costs).
157. See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text (discussing the division among the
courts on whether attorney's fees are recoverable by private litigants).
158. See supra note 49.
159. "[Slome commentators have suggested that private parties who do not mirror the
cleanup procedures employed by EPA may face a high risk of not recovering their response
costs." Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,451 (discussing Martin et al., Private Cost-
Recovery Actions under CERCLA § 107, 1 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 377 (1989)); cf Pinole Point
Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding
that a prima facie case does not require government approval of response costs).
160. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1 1989).
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coverable.162 Thus, the government enjoys a rebuttable presumption of con-
sistency with the NCP, whereas private parties bear an affirmative burden of
proof. 163
It is conceivable that the rationale for having different burdens of proof
has its origin in the congressional and judicial intent to empower the EPA.
The fact remains, however, that PRPs who seek contribution from other
PRPs have a tougher battle to fight. In Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union
Corp. '64 the court outlined the standards for consistency. 65 These stan-
dards basically reflect the criteria used by the EPA in selecting and designing
a response action. Thus, PRPs or private parties seeking cost recovery must
prove that their response action complied with each of the standards.
When the EPA chooses the response action, the PRPs end up defending
the EPA's selection and design of the response action. The PRPs may or
may not have judicial deference in their favor given that the EPA selected
the designated response action. Furthermore, PRPs do not enjoy the sover-
eign immunity that the EPA may enjoy. 166 When PRPs seek contribution
from other PRPs, they must surmount each of these obstacles - prove they
complied with each standard - before a court could find that the PRPs'
162. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
163. When the plaintiff is the government, the burden of proof lies with the defendant to
show that response action was inconsistent with the NCP. Id.
164. 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
165. The court stated:
Section 300.71 of the 1985 NCP provides:
('a)(1) Any person may undertake a response action to reduce or eliminate the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances, or pollutants or contami-
nants. Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes persons to recover certain response
costs consistent with this Plan from responsible parties.
(a)(2) For purposes of cost recovery under § 107 of CERCLA, except for
actions taken pursuant to § 106 of CERCLA or pursuant to pre-authorization
under § 300.25 of this Plan, a response action will be consistent with the NCP
(or for a State or Federal government response, not inconsistent with the NCP),
if the person taking the response action:
(i) Where the action is a removal action, acts in circumstances warranting
removal and implements removal action consistent with § 300.65.
(ii) Where the action is a remedial action:
(A) Provides for appropriate site investigation and analysis of remedial
alternatives as required under § 300.68;
(B) Complies with the provisions of paragraphs (e) through (i) of
§ 300.68 [defining format for remedial investigations];
(C) Selects a cost-effective response; and
(D) Provides an opportunity for appropriate public comment concerning
the selection of a remedial action consistent with paragraph (d) of § 300.67
unless compliance with the legally applicable or relevant and appropriate
State and local requirements identified under paragraph (4) of this section
provides a substantially equivalent opportunity for public involvement in
the choice of a remedy.
Id. at 1575.
166. The government is assumed to have waived sovereign immunity as to compulsory
counterclaims once it institutes a cost recovery action pursuant to § 107 of CERCLA. See
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity when gov-




actions were consistent with the NCP. If the plaintiff is the government,
however, the burden shifts to the defending PRP to prove that the EPA did
not comply with one of the standards. Thus, the government has a substan-
tially easier task in establishing this element of its case.
In Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc. 167 the court interpreted the
compliance standard for private parties as substantial, as opposed to
strict.1 68 The Wickland court found that there had been compliance with
the NCP since the plaintiff's actions were "consistent with CERCLA's broad
remedial purpose." 169 SARA also contained provisions affecting private re-
sponse recoveries.' 70 While "the SARA provisions buttress the liberal view
on private response cost recovery actions that the Ninth Circuit adopted in
Wickland,"' 7 1 the meaning of the term "substantial" has yet to be clearly
defined by the courts. 172
b. Differences in Allowable Costs Recovered - EPA v. PRPs (or
Private Parties)
According to section 107 of CERCLA, the government may recover "all
costs" it incurs during a response action. 173 But, all other persons or parties
may only recover "necessary costs.' 1 7 4 Though the term "necessary costs"
is not statutorily defined, courts have construed the term to mean those costs
incurred while performing response actions.' 75 Even though courts define
necessary costs broadly, 176 there are significant differences among recover-
able costs depending on who the plaintiff is - the government or a PRP,
167. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
168. Id. at 891. "[S]ection 10 7 (a) does not require strict compliance with the national
contingency plan; rather, response costs incurred by a private party may be 'consistent with
the national contingency plan' so long as the response measures promote the broader purposes
of the plan." Id.; see also NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff could satisfy consistency element without showing strict compliance with NCP).
169. Wickland Oil, 792 F.2d at 892.
170. See SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0, (g)(3) (Supp. 1 1989). The most significant change
made by Congress under SARA was to section 113(f), which now allows a PRP to seek its
costs from other PRPs independently of any government suit against those PRPs. See
Holman, supra note 71, at 320.
171. Holman, supra note 71, at 321.
172. See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J.
1989) (holding that response costs could not be recovered because plaintiff had failed to com-
ply with NCP. Plaintiff selected cleanup plan without developing sufficient alternatives, with-
out an opportunity for public comment and, perhaps more importantly, without referring to
the EPA); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1295-996 (D. Del.
1987) (holding response actions inconsistent because plaintiffs had failed to properly evaluate
other alternatives).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1 1989).
174. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B).
175. Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,448. The court in T & E Indus. v. Safety
Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988), accommodated "the omission of a definition for
response costs by reciting the definitions of removal and remedial actions and allowing the
costs incurred for those actions." Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 2, at 10,430 n.292; see also
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). Since CERCLA failed to define "nec-
essary costs" of response, the court concluded that a necessary cost of response must be a cost
necessary to the containment and cleanup of hazardous releases because of the definitions of
removal and remedy. Id. at 1533.
176. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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3. Recovering Indirect/Non-Attributable Costs
The difference in recoverable response costs is contingent on whether the
plaintiff is a governmental entity seeking reimbursement from PRPs or a
PRP seeking contribution from other PRPs. According to CERCLA, the
government can recover "all costs" incurred in a response action.' 77 Some
courts have liberally construed this terminology to include even unidentifi-
able costs. While there is limited case law on this issue, of the few courts
that have addressed it, a majority now allow the government to recover a
type of overhead expense incurred in connection with its response action.
In United States v. Northernaire Plating Co. 178 the EPA requested reim-
bursement for indirect costs. The court defined indirect costs as those costs
that "are necessary to the operation of the program and support of site
cleanup efforts, but which cannot be directly identified to the efforts of any
one site."' 79 The defendant PRP likened these costs to overhead costs' 8 0
and argued that, as such, they were not recoverable as response costs. The
court concluded, however, that the statutory language, "all costs," meant
indirect as well as direct costs.' 8 '
On appeal, the court stated that indirect costs are recoverable because
they are attributable to response efforts.' 82 Even though indirect costs can-
not be linked directly to a specific Superfund site, that does not mean that
the costs did not contribute to the response action taken at a given site. The
court reasoned that these indirect costs are necessary for the existence of a
Superfund program and, therefore, are needed to support the government's
direct response activities. 8 3 Apparently, the EPA is now entitled to recover
a percentage of its indirect expenses, which is in proportion with the specific
case's requirements of the EPA's overall Superfund budget, in a cost recov-
ery action. 184
The Northernaire Plating Co. court also allowed the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to recover non-attributable costs. The DOJ had not itemized its
costs. The money requested by DOJ was not classified as indirect costs,
however, since it was related to the labor costs incurred by the DOJ during
its prosecution of the case. The DOJ established its labor costs for the case
by figuring out, on an annual basis, what percentage of their budget was
allocated to the case. The court concluded that the DOJ need not have an
177. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. I 1989).
178. 685 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aJfd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
179. Id. at 1418.
180. See United States v. Hardage, 733 F. Supp. 1424 (W.D. Okla. 1989), afld in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992). Indirect costs include labor
costs, compensated absences (i.e., holidays, vacations, and sick time), fringe benefits, and train-
ing. Id. at 1437.
181. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. at 1419-20. But cf United States v. Ottati &
Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977, 1004 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding that the indirect costs of the EPA were
not recoverable).
182. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1503.
183. Id.
184. See also Hardage, 733 F. Supp. at 1438 (concluding that the term "all costs" includes
indirect costs despite the meager case law on this issue and authority for both sides).
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itemized cost sheet when recovering its costs. The court did refuse to deter-
mine specifically whether the DOJ would also be entitled to recover indirect
costs in cost recovery actions. 8 5
Indirect and non-attributable costs, however, are not covered by the statu-
tory terminology necessary costs. Even though the term "necessary costs" is
defined liberally by the courts, it is limited to the specified costs of response.
Therefore, PRPs or private parties cannot recover these costs.' 8 6
Furthermore, PRPs may also be prohibited from recovering direct costs.
The Tenth Circuit in Hardage held that direct costs attributable to develop-
ing a remedial response action would not be recoverable if the PRPs in-
curred the response costs in an effort to develop their own remedy for use in
defending against a government injunction action. 187 The court reasoned
that since the defendant PRPs had instigated their own remedial investiga-
tion after the EPA had already done so, the PRPs investigation was unneces-
sary. The court classified these costs as costs borne in anticipation of
litigation. 88 Therefore, since these direct costs were considered litigation
expenses, they were not recoverable by PRPs or private parties.
4. Recovering Attorney's Fees and Other Litigation Costs
Section 104(b) of CERCLA clearly allows governmental entities to re-
cover attorney's fees and court costs.' 89 The courts are split, however, as to
whether private parties, including PRPs seeking contribution, are entitled to
recoup those costs. In T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp. 190 the
court held that "[u]pon careful review of the CERCLA statute, [it] finds no
indication that attorney fees and costs of litigation are recoverable by a pri-
vate litigant."' 19 The court stated that while private parties "may bring an
action for recovery of response costs, they may not bring an action to enforce
185. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. at 1418.
186. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533-34 (discussing the meaning of the term "necessary
cost").
187. Hardage, 982 F.2d at 1448.
188. Even though the PRP's suggested remedy was adopted over the EPA's flawed plan,
this factor could not validate the PRP's expense of remedial investigation. The court reasoned
that it could have rejected the EPA's plan and ordered it to submit a new plan without the aid
or intervention of the PRPs; therefore, the PRPs' costs were still unnecessary. Id.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) provides: "[T]he President may undertake such planning,
legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may
deem necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof,
and to enforce the provisions of this Chapter." Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D. Mich 1988), afl'd sub nom. United
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990)
(holding that under § 107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA, "all costs" included attorney's fees and costs
incurred by the Department of Justice); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that language of § 107(a)(4)(A)
of CERCLA entitled government to attorney's fees and litigation costs).
190. 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988).
191. Id. at 707; see also Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 396 (9th Cir. 1989)(stating that "[tihe prevailing rule is that attorney's fees are not recoverable as response costs
in actions under § 107 of CERCLA brought by private litigants"); New York v. SCA Serv.,
Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp.
57, 62-63 (D.N.H. 1990) (same).
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CERCLA's clean-up provisions against another private entity. Thus, pri-
vate parties do not incur 'enforcement costs' as contemplated by CER-
CLA." 192 Furthermore, in concluding that CERCLA did not provide
private litigants with the opportunity to recoup these expenses, the T & E
Industries court relied on the interpretation of CERCLA's provisions in
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO).19 3 In NEPACCO the court held that since section 104(b) spe-
cifically provides for the government to be reimbursed for legal costs, if Con-
gress had intended for private parties to enjoy the same award, then
Congress would surely have included a similar provision to do so.' 9 4
Yet, some courts have held that attorney's fees and litigation costs are
recoverable by private litigants. 195 In General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus-
trial Automation Systems, Inc. the court of appeals detailed the exact
problems noted in this Comment: If private litigants are not allowed to re-
cover attorney's fees, the prohibition acts as a disincentive for PRPs to par-
ticipate voluntarily in cleanup efforts at hazardous waste sites. The court
stated:
Attorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in this kind of en-
forcement activity and it would strain the statutory language to the
breaking point to read them out of the "necessary costs" that section
9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover. We therefore conclude
that CERCLA authorizes, with a sufficient degree of explicitness, the
recovery by private parties of attorney fees and expenses. This conclu-
sion based on the statutory language is consistent with two of the main
purposes of CERCLA - prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party. These purposes
would be undermined . . . . [since] [t]he litigation costs could easily
approach or even exceed the response costs, thereby serving as a disin-
centive to clean the site.' 96
While this may appear to be persuasive reasoning, most courts refuse to rec-
ognize the need to allow private litigants the opportunity to recover these
costs. Private parties cannot be assured that a court in their jurisdiction will
permit recovery of attorney's fees and other litigation costs.' 9 7
If private litigants were allowed to recover attorney's fees and litigation
costs, a possible problem could develop for the courts in implementing such
192. T & E Indus., Inc., 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13.
193. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see supra note 186.
194. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851.
195. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th
Cir. 1990); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Bolin v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp.
472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Pease & Cuiren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding the "plain meaning" of enforcement activities included attorney's
fees and litigating costs).
196. General Elec. Co., 920 F.2d at 1422 (emphasis added).
197. Compare New York v. SCA Serv., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) with
Shapiro, 741 F. Supp. at 480. In the SCA Serv. case, the court stated that "the prevailing rule"
clearly stated that attorney's fees and litigation costs were not recoverable, whereas in the
previous year in the same district, the Alexanderson court had ruled that since all cost-related
to response actions were recoverable, these costs were recoverable.
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a rule. The problem would be that private litigants would then be able to
recover these costs from the government. While the court in Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States 98 allowed a plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and
litigation costs from the government, 199 the case involved a plaintiff who was
a private party seeking contribution from the United States as a PRP. If
private litigants are allowed to recover these costs, however, the courts must
also be willing to grant them in cases where the private party is a defendant
PRP with a successful counterclaim against the government.
5. Counterclaims - Reducing Cost Recovery
In government-instituted cost recovery actions, counterclaims provide
PRPs with a mechanism to reduce the final judgement awarded to the
EPA.2°° On average, the government recovers ninety to ninety-five percent
of its recovery costs from non-settling PRPs at trial.201 PRPs who have
undertaken a response action in conjunction with or under the direction of
the EPA are not really afforded the opportunity to challenge a response ac-
tion, and if they are financially able, they will be required to pay for the
entire action. PRPs would find it hard to complain in court, after they had
conducted the proposed cleanup plan, that the EPA designed a response
action that cleaned up the site too well (i.e., that it was not the most cost-
effective method) or that the EPA's plan was inconsistent with the NCP
since the plan will also be identified with the PRPs who undertook the plan
in conjunction with the EPA. In contrast, PRPs being sued by the EPA in a
cost recovery action have the opportunity to claim that the EPA's actions in
cleaning up the property caused or would cause the PRPs to incur "unneces-
sary and wasteful" response costs. 20 2
As discussed previously, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, com-
bined with the prohibition of pre-enforcement review, overwhelmingly bene-
fits the EPA. Thus, PRPs who voluntarily participate in a response action
may very well find themselves facing a "Hobson's Choice. ' 20 3 In reality, the
PRPs cannot challenge the EPA's designated response action after they have
conducted the cleanup just as they are prohibited from bringing a challenge
prior to an enforcement action. If the PRPs challenge a designated response
action and the EPA brings an enforcement action, the EPA has the discre-
tion to penalize the PRPs for non-compliance by imposing fines and treble
198. 766 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
199. Id. at 871-72 (holding costs recoverable in order that the overall objectives of CER-
CLA were achieved). The government contended that recovery for these costs should not be
allowed since only the EPA could bring an enforcement action. "The United States may bring
such an action under § 104 or § 106... but private parties may only bring contribution actions
under § 113 or cost recovery claims under § 107." Id. at 870. The court refused to accept the
government's argument because it frustrated the overall purposes of the statute. Id.
200. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
201. Telephone Interview with Frank Biros, chief accountant, EPA's Cost Recovery De-
partment, Feb. 22, 1993.
202. United States v. Nicolet, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,085 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31,
1986).
203. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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damages. 2°4 Yet, in practical terms, voluntarily compliant PRPs would also
be hard pressed to challenge the designated response action that they helped
implement.
As defending PRPs, the possibility exists, however, that they can escape a
certain amount of liability because the response action did not substantially
comply with the NCP's standards. 20 5 On the other hand, some courts have
interpreted compliance issues strictly and liberally in favor of the EPA in an
effort to effectuate the broad purpose of CERCLA. 20 6 Even so, non-comply-
ing defendant PRPs incur less costs than do voluntary PRPs.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. SUMMARY
It is costly for PRPs to comply voluntarily with the EPA from the incep-
tion of an action. The statute specifically states that PRPs shall incur no
benefit as a result of their voluntary compliance. Thus, the PRPs who vol-
untarily comply will not receive any cost savings under the current structure
of CERCLA.
Furthermore, PRPs may actually incur costs in excess of those they would
have incurred if they had waited to be sued by the EPA in a cost recovery
action. These excess costs are not recoverable as necessary costs in contribu-
tion actions. The greatest potential excess cost is the time value of the PRP's
money. Substantial savings can be realized under the current provision re-
garding pre-judgment interest.20 7
Another cost that PRPs will have to bear is indirect costs. While PRPs
may be able to recover actual labor costs, 208 they cannot recover their unas-
sociated, indirect costs such as vacation time, fringe benefits, and sick
time.209 These expenses have to be paid regardless of what type of work the
employees are doing. And even though the government is allowed to recoup
these costs, the total cost is divided among all PRPs. 210 Thus, if PRPs wait
to be sued by the EPA, they will only expend a portion of these costs,
whereas if they had undertaken the response action, they would absorb the
entire cost since the cost cannot be recovered in a contribution action.211
204. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the EPA to
impose punitive damages on non-complying PRPs).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 158-63.
206. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1436 (10th Cir. 1992). While extensive
evidence existed to establish that the government's remediation costs were excessive and unrea-
sonable and that the government's response plan was defective (see supra text accompanying
notes 120-29, discussing the Hardage opinion where the court selected the PRP's proposed
remedy with minor modifications over the EPA's), the court still held that defendant PRPs
had failed to show inconsistency with the NCP. Id. The court concluded that "costs, by
themselves, cannot be inconsistent with the NCP." Id.
207. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of the pre-
judgment interest provision of CERCLA).
208. See T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 706-07 (D.N.J. 1988).
209. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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Other costs that are not recoverable in contribution actions are attorney's
fees and other litigation costs. Once again, voluntarily compliant PRPs
would spend more money than their counterparts who wait to be sued.
Finally, when the government seeks a global consent decree from all iden-
tifiable PRPs, it agrees to supplement fifteen percent of the costs. 21 2 Or, if
the PRPs do not settle, the possibility exists that they will be able to success-
fully counterclaim against the government to reduce the amount of money
the government recovers from them. 2 13 Cost recovery actions usually re-
cover between ninety to ninety-five percent of the actual response costs.
214
Realizing savings ranging between five and fifteen percent where the average
response cost is $27.8 million, not to mention any pre-judgment interest sav-
ings, is a powerful incentive not to become involved until the EPA seeks
some form of recovery.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CERCLA
The current structure of CERCLA acts as a disincentive because PRPs
who voluntarily step into the process bear more of the burdens and costs
than PRPs who wait to be sued. The government thus needs to create posi-
tive incentives for PRPs to come forward early on and work in the process so
that the PRPs have to fund very little of the process and so that they do not
tie up or waste valuable resources on endless litigation. Initial reform should
focus on the evaluation and design of the process. In order to create an
optimal solution, many interests must be considered.
Currently, challenges to the EPA-dominated evaluation and design pro-
cess, previously referred to as "the EPA-designated response action," have
been limited. PRPs who have agreed to undertake a response action cannot
challenge an EPA-designated response action without subjecting themselves
to punitive damages. Punitive damages are not assessable, however, against
PRPs who are not currently obligated to comply.
While CERCLA requires that any review conducted be limited to the
ROD under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the Hardage case ex-
emplifies the folly of this mandate. Even though the general public has sig-
nificant interests in ensuring expeditious and effective cleanup actions, the
courts and Congress should not overlook the efficiency consideration in their
haste. As Hardage indicated, the EPA does not always develop the most
efficient or effective solutions. Also, considering that the EPA is a bureau-
cracy, a fair assumption would be that it rarely achieves efficiency. Before
critics balk at the suggestion of giving economic considerations greater
weight, they should consider the current state of the economy. Response
costs are huge ($28.7 million on average). There can be no doubt that these
costs have a great impact on the PRPs upon which they are assessed. There-
fore, cost needs to play a more important role in the final determinations.
An ideal solution would require that both sides work together to produce
212. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
213. See supra part III.C.5.
214. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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the optimal result. All considerations need to factor into a final decision.
Since the EPA is mainly an advocate of the public health and environmental
welfare and since the PRPs can be relied on to monitor costs diligently, the
solution must utilize both viewpoints. This cannot be achieved now, how-
ever, because the EPA has an authoritarian grant of power. Therefore, no
real negotiation takes place. If voluntary compliance allowed PRPs a
chance at real participation, rather than mandated orders, more PRPs would
be willing to comply. A knowledgeable and neutral arbitrator who could
arbitrate disputes as they arose during the design process might be able to
foster optimal solutions that reflect all needs. Obviously, general guiding
principles would still have to be met. But, the solutions would promote all
interests and, in the spirit of true negotiations, would require compromise
and cooperation among the parties.
Other helpful changes may center on equalizing and clarifying the provi-
sions of CERCLA. For example, the statute could allow PRPs to recover
attorney's fees and other litigation costs. 215 Congress could better define or
imply its intent regarding the term "necessary costs" and "substantial com-
pliance." Congress could make the burden of proof a rebuttable presump-
tion for all parties seeking cost recovery, thereby placing the burden on the
non-compliant, non-settling PRPs with whom the burden rightfully belongs.
There are many ways in which Congress could shift the burden from compli-
ant PRPs to non-compliant PRPs.
Regardless of how Congress chooses to address the current inconsistencies
of CERCLA, it must do so. As it stands currently, CERCLA is a cumber-
some statute that defeats its own purpose by discouraging PRP participa-
tion. Since CERCLA periodically comes up for re-authorization, these are
some considerations for Congress to keep in mind.
215. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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